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The current Vietnamese higher education system is a site of 
contradiction, between the demands of socialism and the trend towards 
a market economy. While moves to extend market principles in Viet 
Nam continue, the role of its higher education system and its Higher 
Education Institutions (HEIs) in promoting socialism has been retained. 
Significant cultural differences remain between a more entrepreneurial 
South, and a more conservative and cultural North. Various social, 
political and historical constraints have persisted to slow or prevent 
reforms in the higher education sector. The mix of public and private 
universities raises problems such as lack of resources, over-enrolment, 
entry standards, and especially the quality of education. Even so, and 
within the framework of socialism, it is likely that private sector growth 
will outstrip growth in the public sector in the future in an attempt to 
meet growing educational demand.  
[Key words: higher education reform, public and private universities and quality] 
Paper presented at ANZCIES Annual Conference, Canberra, December 2006 
Introduction 
The current Vietnamese higher education system is to some extent a site of 
contradiction, between the demands of socialism and the trend towards a market 
economy. While moves to extend market principles in Viet Nam continue, the role 
of its higher education system and its Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in 
promoting socialism has been retained. As recently as the Seventh Party Congress, 
for example, this message was clearly reinforced. The social sciences, were viewed 
as responsible for maintaining official state ideology, in a context where the 
Communist Party is still the only political entity  
…creatively applying Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thoughts in 
the service of informing university faculties in economics, sociology, 
law, management, political science and other social science spheres 
(Savageau 1996). 
The longstanding history of resistance to Chinese, French, Japanese and American 
(and allied) incursions, only ended in 1979, and has left a significant mark on 
Vietnamese society. Re-unification, barely thirty years old, has had a significant 
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effect upon the shaping of its higher education ideology and system. Despite its 
history of struggle against foreign incursions, the development of its higher 
education system was initially influenced by China, then France and the USSR, and 
is now increasingly influenced by western models and ideologies of higher 
education, notably American. China continues to be a strong, if implicit, influence, 
however, as in the example of ‘People’s Universities’, below (Welch 2005).  
While rises in higher education enrolments have significantly outstripped those at 
elementary and secondary levels, (more than doubling each year during the mid 
1990s), the persistence of significant economic constraints are likely to see further 
growth of private higher education. Indeed, despite some problems (see below), 
privatisation (termed in Viet Nam ‘socialisation’), is set to continue and expand over 
the coming decade. Nonetheless, the longstanding value placed on education means 
that it continues to receive strong support by both the state, and households, despite, 
as seen below very low levels of GDP per capita. The government, for example, has 
made sustained efforts to maintain or even extend the proportion of the budget 
devoted to education, which was estimated to be three 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1995. 
To this, however, must be added a further 2.5 per cent of GDP that is contributed by 
households and by formal cost recovery measures, thus making an impressive total 
of some 6 per cent of GDP (Kelly 2000). Nonetheless, for some decades Viet Nam 
has struggled to accommodate demand for higher education, as its secondary schools 
continue to ‘pour out’ graduates eager for places in its colleges and universities. In a 
culture that, as late as the 1990s, was argued still to be steeped in the legacy of 
Confucian mandarinism, the quest for both relevance and quality continues to be 
problematic, no less so with the growth of the private sector. The rise of open 
universities in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City is a significant innovation, 
accounting for more than 52,000 students by 1995, while, as in China, institutional 
mergers have seen former specialised HEIs become part of larger, more 
comprehensive institutions. 
Serious economic reverses hit Viet Nam in the late 1990s, although mediated to a 
degree by the fact that the Dong was not a fully convertible currency. Now, as the 
Viet Khieu remit more and more money to Viet Nam (2003 estimates were US$3.1 
billion, more than foreign direct investment, or the amount that Viet Nam receives in 
aid (SCMP 2005)), and growth rates average close to 7 per cent per annum, even 
foreign universities are establishing branch campuses (Welch 2005).  
Table 1 shows that growth in GDP halved to about 4 per cent in the late 1990s, 
compared to the preceding seven years. Equally, Foreign Direct Investment levels 
fell to one third of 1996/7 levels (World Bank 2000). Despite this, significant 
progress was attained in reducing poverty levels, which, according to World Bank 
measures, fell from 58 per cent in 1993, to 37 per cent in 1998. (Viet Nam has a 
history of insisting on modifications to conventional structural adjustment agendas, 
in line with its commitment to improvements in equity (World Bank 2000: 6)). Viet 
Nam has now set ambitious educational targets for the next decade, as Table 2 
indicates. 
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Table 1. Actual GDP and GDP Growth Rates, Viet Nam, 1995-1999  
GDP 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Real GDP (annual % change) 9.5 9.3 8.2 3.5 4.2 
Per Capita GDP (in U.S. dollars) 290 339 363 361 373 
Source: IMF Country Report 01/59, Table 3: Viet Nam Selected Economic Indicators 1995-2001: 35.  
Table 2. Viet Nam Education Targets 2000–2010 
TARGET 2000 2010 
Adult literacy rate 94% 97% 
Kindergarten net enrolment 81% 98% 
Net Primary enrolment 92% 98% 
Primary school completion rate 66% 85-95% 
Net lower Secondary enrolment 74% 90% 
% of lower secondary enrolment in semi-public and private schools - 20-40% 
% of vocational training students in non-public schools ? 70% 
% of higher education enrolment in semi-public and private HEIs 10%? 30% 
Net upper secondary enrolment 38% 50% 
% of trained working labour force 19% 42% 
Higher Ed. students per 10,000 118 200 
Enrolment of Masters candidates 11,727 38,000 
Enrolment of Doctoral candidates 3,870 15,000 
Lecturers with Masters Degrees 27% 40% 
Lecturers with Doctoral Degrees 18% 25% 
Source:  World Bank Viet Nam 2010. Entering the 21st. Century. Viet Nam Development Report 2001: 62, and 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Education Development Strategic Plan for 2001 –2010. Ha Noi, Education 
Publishing House, 2002: 27.  
It should be noted that if these ambitious targets are met, especially at the upper 
secondary level, it will only further increase the current pressure on the higher 
education system.  
Existing disparities between the two major cities, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh city 
(formerly Sai Gon) and poorer provinces such as Ha Giang, Lai Chau (a 
mountainous northern province with a reported literacy rate of only 49 per cent and 
significant gender disparities), and Quang Tri, already substantial, are at risk of 
being exacerbated, unless coordinated measures are implemented, particularly to 
assist the rural poor. Ethnic disparities also persist, with minorities accounting for 
some 13 per cent of the total population, but only 4 per cent of total education 
enrolments (Kelly 2000). Current measures of attainment in mathematics and 
literacy show that “… the level of attainment outside major cities like Ha Noi is 
poor” (Viet Nam government 2000) Evidence from 1993-98 that per capita 
expenditure in urban areas rose twice as fast as in rural areas, underlines the 
magnitude of the problem, (World Bank 2001) while in education, “…it is doubtful 
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whether the planned budget will be sufficient to cover the costs of the envisaged 
activities” (World Bank 2001: 63) Aware of these budgetary constraints, the strategy 
explicitly recognises the need to acquire resources from the non-state sector and 
households.  
Historical Development of the Education System 
The origins of higher learning in Viet Nam are something like 2,000 years old, and 
institutions of higher learning date back almost a thousand years. The first Royal 
College Quo Tu Giam (Temple of Literature), was established by Emperor Ly in 
1076, and was heavily influenced by the classical Chinese educational model. Even 
at that time, public and private educational institutions co-existed, with “private 
schools contributing much to the dissemination of knowledge” (Dang Ba Lam 1997) 
Ancient influences such as Taoism, Buddhism and especially Confucianism gave 
rise to a Mandarin ethic which, as in its larger and often dominant neighbour China, 
characterized Viet Nam's earliest system of preparation in classical studies for the 
perpetuation of a ruling bureaucratic elite. By the time of onset of French colonial 
era, Vietnamese society was effectively divided into a reasonably meritocratic 
professional class of scholar priests, steeped in the Confucian tradition, (including 
detailed knowledge of Confucian texts, the “Four Books” and “Five Classics,” 
composition of poetry and prose, understanding of (largely Chinese) history and 
government, and demonstrated capacities in composing royal edicts, decrees and 
ceremonial texts), and the Chinese language and script; and the peasant class, 
wedded more to Buddhism, and largely non-literate.  
European, particularly French, colonialism of the latter half of the nineteenth 
century introduced rapid change progressively from the South, (then called 
Cochinchina, and conquered by 1867), to the two northern areas known 
respectively as Annam and Tonkin. Change embraced the establishment of 
European style universities, especially after an Imperial court decision, taken 
in 1919, upon orders from the French. Not least among the changes was the 
addition of Catholicism to a largely Buddhist country, where Confucianism 
was confined to scholars. A further change was extending the use of the 
roman script form, first developed by Alexander de Rhodes in the 17th 
century, and used by the French in the 19th century to extend their hegemony. 
Nationalist resistance to French colonialism often continued to use Chinese 
script, with which the French were less familiar. In at least one respect, 
however, the French system paralleled that of the codified and centralised 
Mandarin style form of higher education that preceded it. The French system 
of the Grandes Ecoles that in France had, since Napoleon, cultivated the 
scientific, educational and administrative elites, was paralleled to a minor 
degree by a French style system of higher education in colonial Indochina. 
Especially in the early 20th century, it produced specialised graduates, almost 
entirely in Ha Noi. It produced graduates that, however, would need to 
pursue further education in metropolitan France. The radicalisation of many 
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of these Vietnamese students, both through their reflections upon the political 
tracts of Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, and often via interaction with 
the French Communist Party, was in direct opposition to French aspirations 
for educated but pliant cadres. At the same time, they often felt poorly 
accepted by both metropolitan and local cultures. To some extent, however, it 
could be seen as structurally paralleling the earlier Mandarin system. A 
further parallel was that government service continued to offer the surest path 
to advancement, even if now dependent more on the favour of the colonisers.  
It was during the early colonial era in 1902 that the School of Medicine and 
Pharmacy (the first school of higher education in Hanoi and considered to be the 
antecedent of the Hanoi University of Medicine) was founded, while a Teacher 
Training college, a College of Law and Administration and a College of Engineering 
were all added before 1920. Some colleges were merged in the 1920s and 1930s to 
form the Indochinese University, also in Hanoi. Providing for the needs of the entire 
Indochina area, it had enrolled some 1,200 students by 1945. The goals of 
colonialism, however, remained at considerable variance with the nationalist 
aspirations of independence-minded students.  
The establishment of two Viet Nams in 1945 (the Democratic Republic of Viet 
Nam, or DRV, in the North and the Republic of Viet Nam in the South) heralded 
two parallel systems of higher education. (Only after the defeat of the Americans in 
1975 led to re-unification, did Viet Nam become the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 
(SRV).) In the former, the statist rigidities of both the classical ‘Mandarin’ era, and 
of French colonialism, arguably lent themselves rather too well to the socialist era. 
Nonetheless, even during the war against the French, which ended with their defeat 
in 1954, a Civil Engineering College and a College of Fine Arts was established 
(Pham Minh Hac: 151). In some ways similar to the Chinese form of socialism 
across the border, the Vietnamese form was, however, markedly more influenced by 
nationalist aspirations, and a major early effort was made to extend the use of 
Vietnamese as the language of instruction. Prior to reunification, in the North, 
nationalism mingled with Communist ideology in the reform of the higher education 
system, with the assistance of fellow socialist states, notably the then USSR. Total 
college and university enrolments in North Viet Nam increased swiftly from 8,000 
to at least 50,000 between 1959 and 1975, by which time existing higher education 
institutions could no longer cope with the swelling ranks of secondary graduates 
(less than 15% of such graduates were able to be accepted into universities). As 
indicated below, this problem has persisted until the present day. Nonetheless, 
progress was impressive, with many new specialist institutions being founded, 
ranging from agriculture and forestry to pharmacy and medicine. By 1970, a total of 
42 universities had been founded, while some 100,000 people graduated from 
Northern universities between 1965 and 1974, strikingly the period of greatest 
hostilities during the Second Indochina War. At the time of re-unification in 1975, 
the DRV (North Viet Nam) had 30 HEIs, all public. Pham Minh Hac cites a total 
enrolment of 56,000 students in 1974/5, 40 per cent of whom were women, with 
8,400 academic staff, (less than 9% of whom possessed doctoral qualifications) 
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(Pham Minh Hac: 152). South Viet Nam, by contrast, had 14 HEIs (seven Public 
and seven Private, the latter often run by religious communities), and a total 
enrolment of 166,000 (Dang Ba Lam 1997: 7).  
At the time, specific forms of foreign cooperation proved of signal importance for 
the development of Vietnamese higher education in the north. Prior to 1976, this 
largely occurred via the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). This 
Soviet sponsored organisation of Russian, Eastern European and other socialist 
states, succeeded the predominantly French influence, during which time numerous 
Vietnamese intellectuals gained postgraduate degrees in France. CMEA offered 
thousands of Vietnamese students opportunities to undertake higher degrees in 
socialist states; indeed it is still common to speak to the Ministry of Education and 
Training (MOET) officials, and others, who, 25 or 30 years ago, studied economics, 
engineering or other specialisms in the former USSR, Romania, the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Czechoslovakia or the USSR. Perhaps 20 to 
25 per cent of all graduate students in the DRV gained their training in this way, 
between 1955 and 1965. Some 593 students were sent from the Democratic 
Republic of Viet Nam (DRV) between 1951 and 1954, and Nguyen and Sloper 
argued that, over the period 1961-70, some 12 Vietnamese gained their higher 
doctoral degrees in the USSR, and another five gained similar qualifications from 
the former GDR. The following decade saw further growth, with USSR doctorates 
rising to 25 and GDR to 18, with another four from Poland, one from Bulgaria, and 
one from Hungary ( Nguyen Tien Dat & Sloper 1995: 119). All in all, however, the 
numbers were much more substantial: some 30,775 students went abroad to study 
between 1955 and 1975, 55 per cent of them in the USSR (Lam 1997: 11). Pham 
Minh Hac cites MOET figures to show that of the national total of holders of the 
Kandidat Nauk, and Doktor Nauk (4,500), some 3,500 gained their degrees from the 
former USSR (Pham Minh Hac: 163). 
The defeat and departure of the Americans in 1975 heralded a more unified 
approach in higher education, although in practice, significant cultural differences 
remain between a more entrepreneurial South, and a more conservative and cultural 
North. (As one consequence, for example, there are today, more private ‘People’s’ 
universities in the South than the North.)  
The period of transformation or renovation known in Viet Nam as Doi Moi, dates 
from the mid 1980s (that is, a little after the period when China undertook a parallel 
process), in particular from the important Sixth Party Congress of 1986. An 
important part of this transformation from a state-centralised economy and society 
was the renovation of the Vietnamese education and training system, which suffered 
from most of the rigidities of a command economy. While the (MOET) was 
nominally in charge of the entire higher education system, in practice this was not 
always the case. Numerous old Soviet-style institutions existed, frequently under the 
control of specialised Ministries such as Agriculture, or Finance:  
In 1983, only 16 universities were administered by the Ministry of 
Higher and Vocational Education. Others were under the auspices of 
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other corresponding ministries. For example, the medical schools were 
under the Ministry of Health, the agricultural colleges were under the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and colleges of architecture, under a ministry in 
charge of construction. (UNDP 1992) 
Nevertheless, interest in higher education remained strong, and enrolments grew 
from 127,312 in 1986-7, to 414,183 in 1995-6 (Savageau 1996: 84). 
All in all, as was pointed out as long as a decade ago, by the UNDP/UNESCO 
"Educational and Human Resources Sector Analysis", at least the following four 
factors vitiated educational progress in Viet Nam, despite high literacy rates, and a 
long history of great respect and enthusiasm for education (UNDP 1992).  
1. Inadequate provision and coordination among higher education elements 
and poor linkage with research, production and employment.  
2. Severe lack and low efficiency in the use of resources for education and 
training. 
3. Inappropriate system of organisation and management in education and 
training. 
4. The irrelevance of much of the existing higher education and training to 
Vietnamese society undergoing transition (Savageau 1996).  
Most of these problems persist. As in Thailand and Indonesia, moves towards self-
management of HEIs have been made; and as in those countries, progress has been 
slow and patchy.  
While the founding of a Ministry of Higher, Vocational and Technical Education in 
1965 had been one response to the initial problem listed above, lack of overall 
coordination persisted, partly due to inter-ministerial rivalries. Not until 1990 did 
The Ministry of General Education and the Ministry of Higher, Technical and 
Vocational Education merge into the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). 
Even then, as indicated above, the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
(MOLISA) retained control of much of the technical and vocational education and 
training (TVET) area. Just as Vietnamese politics is often riven by disputes between 
rival Ministries, so too in the sphere of education and training. For example, the 
vocational education and training (VET) area has been for some years (and 
continues to be) the subject of vigorous dispute between MOET and its rival the 
MOLISA. A further constraint was economic, in that the equipment and facilities at 
Vietnamese higher education institutions were often outmoded, and of poor quality, 
often reflecting the origins and priorities of donor countries and organisations, as 
much as those of Vietnamese users. This, too, continues, although to differing 
degrees.  
Rigid and narrow specialisation, a product of the Soviet influence, meant that 
graduates were not always well equipped to meet the changing needs of a 
transitional economy, while the proliferation of smaller institutions meant that 
42 Ho Chi Minh Meets the Market: Public and Private Higher Education in Viet Nam 
 
economies of scale were non-existent, and training too narrow and specialised. 
Students and their teachers often still have little conception that a wider and more 
flexible system might well be more appropriate to their needs, as well as those of the 
economy. Hence, when advising applicants for development scholarship 
opportunities at universities abroad, Vietnamese students often insist they wish to 
pursue extremely narrow and rigid specialisations such as offshore petroleum 
exploration engineering, with little consciousness of the wider disciplinary and 
development context within which specialism exist.  
Lack of responsiveness on the part of the higher education system was also evident 
in the over-production of science and technological graduates, relative to the training 
of technicians, who they supposedly supervised. Inevitably, this credentialism led to 
a decline in job satisfaction, as graduates were forced into taking jobs below the 
level for which they had been trained.  
All in all, many of the constraints listed above persisted into the Doi Moi era, and 
slowed or prevented further reforms in the higher education sector. The Doi Moi 
reforms paralleled Perestroika and Glasnost to a degree, and the period of structural 
reform and opening in China. Although desire for reform was genuine, as was 
recognition of the limits that structural and ideological rigidities placed on 
development, there was never any intention to change the role of the Party as 
leading the masses towards socialism. Nor the continued promotion of Marxist-
Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought in higher education, literature, culture and the 
media. Thus, to the legacies of colonialism, two Indo-China wars, traditions of 
centralised authority, and the period of two Viet Nams, were added the tensions of 
retaining socialist goals in a society moving towards the market. Additional pressure 
for reforms leading towards a market driven economy and, by implication, 
liberalisation and limited democracy came from the loss of its traditional important 
support from Eastern Europe, notably the former USSR, and ongoing pressure from 
international organs such as the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. This 
has perpetuated some of the tensions pointed to in different elements of the Castells 
model.  
Revisions to the educational provisions in the Vietnamese constitution in 1992, 
represented a retreat from the Party’s intention to micro-manage the economy, and 
were part of a set of reforms that to some extent flowed from the UNDP Sector 
Analysis report of 1992. One example was institutional consolidation: by 1993, for 
example, Hanoi’s Pedagogical University, the Foreign Language Institute and the 
University of Hanoi were combined to form the National University of Hanoi, which 
subsequently served as a model for other urban universities in Viet Nam. 
Considerable institutional consolidation took place over the following decade, with 
the total number of HEIs shrinking from 102 in 1993 to 77 in 2002 (MOET, 2002: 
8). Consolidation obviously was in the public sector, since private HEIs increased in 
number over the period. 
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By 1992 also, consonant with the reform era, constitutional provisions had been 
amended, especially the new Article 36, which no longer claimed a monopoly in 
educational provision:  
The State shall ensure the harmonious development of the 
educational system: pre-school education, general education, 
vocational training, college and post-graduate education; it shall 
enforce the generalization of primary education, eliminate 
illiteracy; it shall develop various educational institutions: State-
run schools, people-run schools, and others. The State gives 
priority investment to education and encouragement to other 
investors. (Savageau 1996) 
By about this time, the first dan lap or ‘People-established’ universities had been 
created, notably, in the North, Dong Do, Phuong Dong and Thang Long universities. 
After a hesitant beginning, eight such “People’s” HEIs had been established by 1995 
in Viet Nam, almost all with a restricted core of offerings, largely cohering around 
mathematics, IT, and business studies (Tran Kieu & Nguyen Huu Chau 2000: 225). 
(The current total number of public universities and colleges in Viet Nam is more 
than 55, excluding specialist colleges for the Army, and Home Affairs Ministry, but 
including specialist colleges for minorities.) The first of these “People’s” 
universities was Thang Long, in Ha Noi, founded in 1988, but by 1995, more such 
private HEIs existed in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Sai Gon) than in Ha Noi, with 
an additional institution in Da Nang. MOET figures for 2002 list 17 such Ngoai 
cong lap dai hoc or ‘non-public’ universities. In addition, six Ngoai cong lap cao 
dang, or non-public colleges are listed. The distinction is largely between those 
HEIs that offer a four year qualification, termed universities, and those which offer 
shorter cycle associate type degrees, sometimes now termed in English junior 
colleges or community colleges. 
A significant index of how sensitive this issue of reforming the mix of public and 
private universities continues to be in contemporary Viet Nam, can be seen in the 
careful choice of terminology with which to officially describe it. Privatisation is 
clearly at odds with a socialist ideology, hence is termed “socialisation.” (This can 
mean a substantial change at the resource level, however—it has recently been 
claimed, for example, that “… in many places, 50 per cent of the primary education 
budget (is) contributed by the people and local budget” (Tran and Nguyen 2000: 
226)). Equally, the use of the term “People’s University”, (rather like their structural 
equivalent in China, the Minban) avoids the un-wished for term ‘private’ university. 
Despite this carefully elaborated official discourse, the People’s universities are 
entirely dependent on fees and donations, since they attract no government grants. 
There is also an intermediary category of institution, ban cong or ‘semi-public’, 
which is usually established by government grant, and managed by a public 
authority at central, province of district level, but which is dependent on student fees 
for its operational costs.  
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While some “People’s universities” may attract a government grant of land, or at 
least permission to purchase or lease land at a subsidised rate, one of the more well 
known People’s Universities in the North, Thang Long University, for example, 
claims that it is still waiting for a government promise of this kind to be fulfilled—
and in any event, lacks the funds for such a purchase, even if it were to become 
available.  
Total current enrolments by category are seen in Table 3 which, as well as the size 
of the public and private sectors, also gives an idea of the relative under-
representation of women and minorities in higher education. 














Female 91,457 309,506 400,963 103,323 328,000 431,323 
Minority  1,817   1,425    3,242   2,229   1,787   4,016 
Public 171,922 642,041 813,963 192,466 680,663 873,129 
Non-Public 14,801 89,464 104,265   18,397  82,593 100,990 
Full Time 148,893 403,568 552,461 167,476 411,721 579,197 
In-Service 19,819 223,837 243,656   24,478 251,600 276,078 
Other 18,011 104,100 122,111   18,909  99,935 118,844 
Graduate Students 45,757 117,353 163,110   47,133 121,804 168,937 
TOTAL 186,723 731,505 918,228 210,863 763,256 974,119 
Source: Education and Training in Viet Nam 2002, MOET 2002, Information Section, MOET 2002 
While it is clear that there is a degree of double counting in some of the above 
categories (a student may be counted as Female but also Minority), it is clear that 
higher education enrolments are continuing to grow strongly, and private sector 
enrolments particularly so, as Table 4 reveals.  
Table 4. Enrolments, Public Semi-Public and Private HEIs (1996/7–1998/9) 














Public  525,596 88.50  631,994   88.35   696,375   87.17 
Semi Public   42,448  7.15   37,518    5.25   33,254   4.16 
People’s   25,840  4.35   45,719    6.39   69,288   8.67 
TOTAL  593,884 100.00  715 ,321  100.00  798,817 100.00 
Source:  Information Section MOET 2002.  
What is clear from the above is that, while growth in the public sector is still strong, 
relative growth rates are much stronger in the “People’s” category, while the 
somewhat anomalous semi-public category seems to be fading in significance. 
Effectively, private sector HEIs doubled their share of enrolments over the three 
years covered in Table Four. Putting the information in the preceding two tables 
together, it seems reasonable to predict that relative growth in private sector HEIs 
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will continue to outstrip that in the public sector over the foreseeable future. On this 
account, the apparent fall in private sector HEI enrolments from 2001 to 2002 is 
something of an anomaly, or perhaps an outcome of the MOET crackdown.  
Current and Future Challenges 
Viet Nam is a poor country, and some of the challenges it faces in higher education 
are a product of that fact. The current GDP per capita is still low, the rate of 
malnutrition among children, for example, is still a very high 41 per cent, (Tran & 
Nguyen 2000: 234) and in the light of such circumstances, and ongoing economic 
difficulties, it is not surprising that there are clear limits to what can be achieved by 
the state. It is thus all the more impressive that the proportion of the state budget 
devoted to education rose from 8 per cent in 1990 to a claimed 15 per cent in 2000 
(Tran & Nguyen 2000: 235). While economic growth rates slowed in the late 1990s, 
Viet Nam was insulated to a degree from the regional economic crisis, since among 
other things, it did not have a fully convertible currency. While annual growth rates 
slipped below 5 per cent in the last two years of the previous century, these have 
now risen again to significantly higher levels. North South differences persist, and 
development in Ho Chi Minh City has outstripped much of the rest of the country—
a city of some seven million inhabitants, it now accounts for 18.4 per cent of 
national GDP, and GDP growth for 2004 was 11.6 per cent. Foreign investment 
increased by some 40 per cent in 2004, with Hong Kong being the largest investors. 
Services such as banking and tourism are expected to reach 50 per cent of the local 
economy in 2005. Ho Chi Minh City leaders already give industry a back seat to the 
services sector (SCMP 2005).  
As indicated above, for some decades Viet Nam has been unable to provide anything 
like sufficient higher education places to cater for qualified secondary graduates. At 
the same time, educational quality has also been a longstanding problem. To some 
extent the two problems collide, as is well recognised domestically: 
In education and training in Viet Nam at present there are two conflicting 
requirements: on the one hand, the demand for rapid expansion of the scale of 
provision, and on the other hand, the requirement to improve the quality of 
provision. These two demands are legitimate, but the education sector’s 
capacities are limited (Tran & Nguyen 2000: 235). 
The limitations of a generally hidebound pedagogical tradition represent one threat 
to quality. In general within the Vietnamese system, ‘programme, text books and 
study materials continue to be major… issues.’ (Tran & Nguyen 2000: 227), while a 
rather stolid pedagogy has also often been a limitation on teaching and learning:   
One major shortcoming in the recent past has been a lack of measures to 
reform the teaching method, which is still quite conservative – the teacher 
reads, the pupils take notes; the main reliance is upon memory instead of 
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thinking, study is passive. There is a serious shortage of … equipment to 
renovate the method of teaching and learning (Tran & Nguyen 2000: 227). 
Another is the training of academic staff, many of whom gained their postgraduate 
qualifications, if any, decades ago in Eastern Europe, and have had little change to 
update their expertise since, especially since the collapse of support schemes from 
those former socialist, sister states. Some idea of the limits on staff quality can be 
gained from Table 5. 
Table 5. Number of Academic Staff, by Degree, Viet Nam, 2000/1 and 2001/2  
Degree Held Numbers of 
Staff 2000/1 




% of total 
2001/2 
Doctoral Degree* 4,454 18.28 4,812 19.75 
Masters 6,596 27.07 7,583 31.12 
Professional Qualification   569   2.40   586  2.40  
Uni/College qualification 12,422 50.73 12,361 50.73 
Other 321   1.31 204   0.83 
TOTAL 24,362 100.00 25,546 100.00   
* This is likely to include both the qualifications Doktor Nauk, and Kandidat Nauk.  
Source:  Education and Training in Viet Nam 2002, MOET 2002: 8. 
It can be seen from the above that, even allowing for the fact that it is likely that 
both Doktor and Kandidat degrees have been aggregated in the doctoral category, 
less than 20 per cent of Vietnamese academics have this level of qualification, and 
only 30 per cent the lesser Masters qualification.  
By 2002, some of these People’s universities, notably (in the North) Thang Long 
and Dong Do, had been established for more than a decade, the latter proudly 
indicating that, for the first time it had succeeded in filling all 1,000 places allocated 
to it by the MOET. The ongoing pressure on the public system, which can still only 
find places for at most 10 per cent of qualified secondary graduates, means that the 
future demand for private higher education is likely to remain strong, and MOET 
plans are for the private higher education sector to assume 30 per cent of total higher 
education enrolments by 2010. The current proportion is 11 per cent (Strategic Plan: 
10). Nonetheless, if private higher education is to expand, quality control will be 
paramount, and, despite recent legislation that stipulates the means whereby 
“People’s” universities can be instituted, their financial management, that they must 
regularly scrutinise their own activities and be periodically supervised and inspected 
by MOET1, it is not clear that a robust and rigorous mechanism of quality assurance 
is actually in operation. A study is being undertaken of the issues involved.  
Meanwhile, serious problems have surfaced in at least some of the private HEIs. At 
least two difficulties are apparent, both raised in the course of the current official 
police investigation of the Rector and other senior staff at Dong Do University. Each 
also arguably relates to their status as non-state institutions, ineligible for public 
funds. The first issue is that of over-enrolment, in a situation where MOET sets 
legally defined enrolment limits for such institutions. Dong Do was accused of 
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substantially exceeding its quota, and an official investigation launched by MOET 
indeed confirmed that it had over-enrolled—to the tune of 2.8 times its MOET 
quota. Thus for the academic year 2001/2 alone, Dong Do had enrolled 4,205 
students, rather than its allotted 1,500. Curiously, however, the problems had been 
known for some years: The Dong Do University scandal first surfaced in October 
1998 when officials of the Ministry of Education and Training found that the 
number of students admitted to the university far surpassed the permitted figure 
(Viet Nam News 2002, June 19).  
The second issue is one of entry standards. This is of importance in a system where 
overall quality is still problematic. Whereas state universities accept entry level 
students whose aggregate of their three best subjects, each with a possible total of 
10, totals around 20 or so, it is said that some People’s universities are accepting 
students with lower scores, perhaps 15 or even less. While this may be seen as 
simply an issue of quality, it was alleged in 2001 that the leaders of Dong Do 
People’s University had been routinely accepting bribes by students or their 
families, in order to secure entry to the institution. This, too, is strictly illegal, and 
may well be weakening the quality of the student cohort even further, but allegedly 
occurred, in an effort to boost numbers of enrolments and income levels.  
The official MOET investigation did indeed uncover substantial breaches of 
mandated procedures. Some papers were given marks of eight or nine out of ten, at 
times by unqualified markers, when their real grade was assessed at as low as half a 
mark. Several dozen students were accepted for enrolment without even being on 
the list of students for selection. Another 380 had no upper secondary graduation 
certificates at all. All in all, some 80 per cent of students accepted for enrolment at 
Dong Do were found to have scores lower than that reported by the university 
Council, while some had had their marks increased by re-scoring. Beyond these 
serious breaches of procedure, the investigating team also found that the university 
had failed to build any facilities, offices or classrooms in seven years of operation, 
or to invest in enhancing the quality of academic staff. Facilities were assessed as 
not meeting the standards of a university.2 
As a result of this investigation, Dong Do’s 2002 enrolments were deemed to be 
cancelled, and the university was given strict instructions to end such illegal 
practices. The Ha Noi police were called in to conduct an investigation, and if 
necessary, proceed to prosecutions against the Rector and other senior staff 
responsible. The Deputy Chair of its board of management was subpoenaed “… for 
his involvement in of the biggest scandals to date in the education sector” (Viet Nam 
News 2002, June 19). The former director of its Training Department was also 
charged in relation to the affair.  
At times, too, ‘gamekeeper has turned poacher’. In a separate case in 2002, two 
senior MOET officials, both at Deputy Minister level, were reprimanded or 
punished, after their involvement in the ‘Asia International University’ scam was 
revealed. Both officials were linked with the “…bogus university, which set up shop 
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in Viet Nam, and enrolled thousands, awarding worthless paper degrees” (Viet Nam 
News 2002, October 7). 
Other People’s Universities seem more reputable. Thang Long, for example, 
initiated in the South in 1988 as a ‘university centre’ and accredited by MOET in the 
same year, was established on a non-profit basis, (Hoang Suan Xinh & Sloper 1995: 
201) and is now a full-fledged university in Ha Noi, with three Faculties (Business 
Administration, Maths and IT, and Foreign Languages). Its total enrolment is 
currently 2877 students. Management is by far the largest faculty. Its board or 
council consists of some well-known figures in Vietnamese higher education, and 
more than one of its senior staff are or have been associated with a major public 
university.  
Some 50 per cent of its teaching is undertaken by staff from such public HEIs. 
While academic moonlighting is by no means uncommon, this ongoing problem for 
Vietnamese higher education also raises significant issues of quality. Salaries for 
public sector HEI academic staff are low, and it is by no means uncommon for 
individuals to undertake a second job, or have a small business, in addition to their 
main employment. In order to counter this practice, some larger HEIs “…provide 
supplements out of fees” (Viet Nam Public Expenditure Review 2000:170).  
Adding to the financial plight of public sector HEIs, is the fact that the share of 
overall education expenditure allocated to higher education, has fallen significantly 
—from 16 per cent in 1992 to 13 per cent in 1998. Table 6, shows the changing 
balance in proportions of expenditures from various sources in higher education, in 
the mid to late 1990s.  
Table 6. Changes in Proportions of Expenditure, Higher and Vocational 
Education, 1993-98  
Higher and Vocational Education 1993 1998 
Public Subsidies 71 46 
Charges to Public 9 18 
Direct Costs to Parents 20 36 
TOTAL 100% 100% 
Source:  Viet Nam Public Sector Expenditure Review. Joint Report of the Government of Viet Nam–Donor 
Working Party on Public Expenditure Review. (Mid Year Meeting Report). Ha Noi, 2000: 61. 
As can be seen in the table, government support for public HEIs plunged over the 
1990s, while direct costs to parents soared. Kelly cites figures showing a substantial 
mismatch between enrolment growth, and growth of expenditures, with the latter 
rising from 117 per cent from 1993 and 1995, but the former by a much more 
modest 63 per cent (Kelly 2000: 3). Charges to the community doubled. It is 
somewhat surprising, therefore, to note a parallel government pledge to raise 
spending on education to some 15 per cent of the state budget, by 2000 (Kelly 2000: 
1).  
In the context described above, the enticement for public-sector academics of 
working at a private, fee-paying HEI may well be substantial, and can certainly offer 
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a significant income boost to the individual concerned. Private HEIs may pay a 
relatively handsome hourly rate, for “well trained professors from the public 
sector… and this damages the interests of the public HE sector”. According to 
Thiep, the differentials can be dramatic: perhaps 15-20,000 Dong for an hour of 
instruction at a public HEI, compared with perhaps 50-70,000 Dong at a private 
HEI. In practice, it means that the quality of teaching at each institution may suffer, 
as well as time available for students. Certainly, some public HEIs begrudge the 
time and energy spent away from their full-time job by some of their academic staff, 
pursuing a parallel, part time appointment at a “People’s” university. Peer 
resentment, by less fortunate colleagues, is also common.  
Of the 54 teaching staff at Thang Long, seven have Ph.Ds., a further 32 have a 
masters qualification, while another three are undertaking doctoral studies. A five-
storey building has been rented for the academic year 2002/3, and the university has 
ambitions to grow and become more prestigious. A very senior Thang Long 
academic indicated that, until 2002, it had never filled its annual quota of 1,000 
students, because it has insisted on maintaining high entry standards. Fees are 
modestly set at around 1million Dong per trimester, or a little over US$200 per 
annum, and the university seeks to ensure that poverty is not a barrier to entry. In 
practice, however, resources are modest and it only grants five scholarships per 
annum. In general one can say that fees within private sector HEIs is about 50 per 
cent higher than that in public sector HEIs. Staff student ratios at Thang Long are 
said to be 1: 28, although it is not clear how representative this is of the sector.  
Thang Long Graduates are said to be in high demand, and students must maintain a 
solid academic performance level, in order to retain their place at the university. 
Despite its location in the North, where it is admitted that “people have no clear idea 
of private education… [and] seldom have families abroad” [who can assist with 
fees] (Hoang Xuan Sinh & Sloper 1995: 203-4), it is continuing to grow and mature. 
Support from the Vietnamese diaspora was important in the early years, (but has 
been of greater significance in the development of private HEIs in the south of Viet 
Nam), and it continues to receive support from the Institut Superieur de Gestion in 
Paris, in the form of training provided for Thang Long professors in Paris, or 
sending books and French advisers.  
All in all, the dynamic private sector seems set to grow. When hard-pressed public 
sector HEIs can only find places for about 10 per cent of secondary graduates, such 
growth is predictable. At the same time, problems abound. Although MOET has 
now set up teams to investigate the operation of such HEIs, to ensure that additional 
staff are hired when enrolments rise, and that institutions do not exceed their allotted 
quota, the regulatory system in general is weak, and perhaps arbitrary on occasion. 
Corruption, a rising concern in contemporary Viet Nam, may also be a problem, as 
in the example above. On the other hand, private sector HEIs complain they are 
over-regulated, compared to their peers in public HEIs, who get far more resources 
for their work. As indicated above, private HEIs receive no financial aid from the 
government.  
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Quality 
Issues of quality of higher education are not limited to the private sector, however. 
Indeed, certain system-wide weaknesses have been pointed out for years, (Thiep 
1995) and remain a problem. Despite significant efforts to provide some upgrading 
for academic staff, (it was claimed in 1996 that some 30 per cent of staff had availed 
themselves of some professional development in the preceding years), only a modest 
6 per cent of the national research budget is applied to this task (Dang Ba Lam 1997: 
8). Difficulties in providing professional development are again acknowledged in 
the Education Development Strategic Plan (2002): “In particular, the academic staff 
of higher education rarely have opportunities for regularly updating their knowledge 
and accessing …new scientific and technological achievements of the world.” This 
limitation on staffing quality is only exacerbated by the current retirement of 
significant numbers of the academic profession, leading to significant shortages, 
especially in key areas such as IT and Business, where the material rewards are far 
greater outside of higher education. Progress in establishing a solid regulatory 
regime has been slow and piecemeal and it is only in 2002 that a quality assurance 
unit was established by MOET. World Bank resources have been made available to 
establish the process, and the government has also injected some resources, and 
indicated that institutions that comply will be rewarded (perhaps with land grants).  
The low quality of graduates is also a common complaint. The fact that graduate 
unemployment is still a widespread problem is often said to be linked to the 
indifferent quality of many graduates, the lack of responsiveness by certain 
institutions to the actual needs of employers and industries, as also the outmoded 
curriculum of many courses. Although the quality of entrants to public HEIs is still 
higher than that in private institutions, there are claims that at least some private HEI 
graduates are more sought after in the job market, as their curricula is at times more 
responsive to actual industry needs. The rise of Open enrolments at a number of 
universities, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, (often in an effort to raise funds for 
the HEI), also weakened quality, since entry was based on wealth.  
Students access to these courses was based on their ability to pay fees, 
in some cases almost irrespective of the academic credentials. … 
Students who completed the open mode degree received a graduation 
diploma endorsed with the words ‘mo rong’. These degrees did not 
usually have a high status, and were not normally accepted for entry to 
postgraduate programs. (Kelly 2000: 7) 
Resources 
The current climate is a harsh one for higher education, and nowhere does the chill 
winds of financial austerity blow more keenly than in the developing world. As 
revealed above, Viet Nam is no exception, and given the increasing mismatch 
between spiralling demand, and relative diminution in government support (see 
Table 6, above), it is no surprise to find that public sector HEIs in Viet Nam have 
had no recourse but to develop other sources of income. Sang and Sloper showed 
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that Colleges and Universities were already supplying substantial proportions of 
their budget (from four to 28%) from ‘other sources’ in the early 1990s (Sang & 
Sloper 1995: 174), and there is little evidence to show that this pattern has done 
anything but broaden and intensify. Citing the Viet Nam example, Bray has argued 
that the scale of such income generation chiefly depends on: 
• the product or service that can be provided (which does not always relate to 
the primary mission of the institutions) 
• the entrepreneurial capability and culture within the institution, and 
• the state of institutional infrastructure—personnel, organisational and 
technical—which creates the basis for delivering a desired product or 
service (Bray 2002: 10). 
Of course, HEIs with a faculty profile that can more easily be turned to account, or 
located close to industries and in large population centres, will be best able to take 
advantage of this changing climate. Smaller or poorer HEIs, those in rural areas 
away from the reach of industries, or offering subjects that cannot easily be turned 
into commercial training contracts, or strategic research initiatives, will suffer 
accordingly. Nonetheless rural Vietnamese HEIs rural institutions also have 
opportunities to supplement revenues, as Bray indicates: raising poultry, producing 
vegetables, managing restaurants, and making clothes. While on the one hand, such 
activities deflect academics from their core missions as teachers and scholars, it 
must also be acknowledged that such activities at least sustain the institution. Fees, 
which in ‘People’s’ universities range from around 2.5m to 4.5m Dong per annum, 
are significantly lower in public HEIs, but are continuing to increase in each sector. 
Fees at Ha Noi Economics, for example, are around 1.5m Dong annually, but less 
prestigious HEIs in rural areas charge much less.  
The introduction of fees, while relatively modest by international standards, has a 
disproportionate effect on poorer citizens, often in rural areas. “Social equality has 
not yet been realised. Children from poor families encounter many difficulties in 
continuing their studies” (Dang Ba Lam 1997: 11). The effects are clear. While full-
time equivalent (FTE) student numbers rose by an annual 16 per cent from 1996-98 
(a total rise of 55%) total revenues rose more slowly, while the “growth of revenues 
from government has declined significantly” (Viet Nam Public Expenditures 
Review 2000: Vol. 2 Annexes, p. 166). In fact by 1998, it had virtually plateaued. 
“Fees in 1998 accounted for about 36 per cent of total revenues, compared with 24 
per cent three years previously.” Revenues per student declined from almost 3,500 
in 1996 to little more than 2,500 in 1998 (Ibid: 167). Over the same period, staff 
student ratios declined from 1:18 to 1:25, a difference of 39 per cent, largely 
accounted for by a substantial rise in teaching hours per staff member, from about 
three hundred and fifty hours to around four hundred and ten.  
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Devolution, Regulation and Private Higher Education  
It is apparent from the above, that there is a real need for a rigorous regulatory 
regime to promote quality improvement in higher education, not least among private 
HEIs. While measures have been introduced in recent years to regulate and provide 
some financial incentives for the development of private HEIs, quality control is not 
yet all that it should be, as the examples of Dong Do and Asian International 
University attest. It is also clear, that in a climate of financial austerity, there is a 
degree of institutional resistance within some public sector HEIs towards moves to 
extend self-governance, and the parallel moves to increase budgetary responsibilities 
at the institutional level.  
International Influences and Alliances 
A major priority for Viet Nam in the coming years is to raise quality and extend 
access via international alliances and initiatives. This is part of a wider issue of how 
Viet Nam deals with its substantial diaspora, (now calculated at around 2.7 million 
worldwide), significant sections of which (rather like Cuba) are stringently opposed 
to the current government. Notwithstanding these difficulties, substantial foreign 
direct investment is occurring, and remittances from overseas Vietnamese have risen 
spectacularly: 
The overall inflow from Viet Khieu has doubled in recent years, rising 
to US$3.1 billion in 2003, and US$6 billion in 2006 (New York Times 
2006)—it “now outstrips the amount Viet Nam receives in either 
foreign aid or international investment”. (See also SCMP 2005a, Welch 
2005) 
While evidence is unsystematic, it is clear that some of this money supports higher 
education enrolments.  
Specific decrees such as the recent No. 18 and No. 6, regulate the establishment of 
overseas providers in Viet Nam, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
must also give its approval in each case.  
Three examples indicate the diversity of international influences and effects. Based 
on a longstanding presence and history of cooperation with local partners in Viet 
Nam, the Australian Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) established a 
purpose built campus in Ho Chi Minh City, (with the aid of a US$20m injection of 
funds from the US based Atlantic Philanthropy). It currently offers, inter alia, a 
short-term CELTA-accredited English language teaching course at a fee of almost 
A$2,500 (around US$1,400). Fees for its full-time MBA programme are US$6,000 
per year, a substantial sum in Viet Nam. Nonetheless, ambitious growth targets have 
already been met—2006 figures show an enrolment growth of 40 per cent, to some 
three thousand EFTS, and plans for 2007 are for further growth, of 30 per cent. 
According to its President and CEO, Michael Mann, (former Ambassador to Viet 
Nam), RMIT Viet Nam is currently the largest employer of foreigners in the 
country, with a total of one hundred and twenty (Mann 2006).  
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Another form of internationalisation is twinning, such as has existed for almost a 
decade between two Vietnamese universities, (Ha Noi Economics and Ho Chi Minh 
Economics), and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, Netherlands. Founded 
as a donor program in 1994, the two-year course graduates 60 students a year, using 
Dutch, Vietnamese and other international teaching staff. Six million guilders (about 
US$3m) was shared by each of the two Vietnamese campuses from 1998, but as aid 
and teaching support from Holland has gradually been phased out, the course, taught 
entirely in English, has moved from full-time to part time, to cater both for local 
employed Vietnamese students, as also others who may be on mission for an 
agency, or employed in Viet Nam on a commercial contract.  
A less successful venture has been by Ha Noi Economics with the United Kingdom 
Henley Management Centre. While five classes, with a total enrolment of about one 
hundred, exist in Viet Nam, including in Sai Gon, the original fee of US$ 15,000 
was found to be too high, which a subsequent reduction to US$13,500 did little to 
remedy. Staff at Ha Noi Economics School of Business also felt that there was 
insufficient support by the United Kingdom institution, and has now terminated the 
arrangement, preferring to pursue a cooperative arrangement with the Australian 
Swinburne University, that has been much more ready to provide substantial 
support. Websites of overseas institutions are becoming more important in recruiting 
Vietnamese students, and the British Council launched a bi-lingual education 
website in 2002, to inform students interested in studying in the United Kingdom 
(Viet Nam News 2002, 7 October).  
Brain Drain  
Some 15,000 Vietnamese students study abroad each year, and the government now 
encourages families who can afford to do so, to send their children abroad for 
further studies. By no means all return at the end of their studies and brain drain is a 
longstanding and significant issue. In addition, the government has sent thousands of 
students abroad. The SRV has recently introduced a special scheme to encourage 
study abroad opportunities for its younger talent. Each year, 400 students are given 
scholarships to study abroad, in areas deemed to be of high national priority (such as 
IT, Maths, and the Sciences). Each student is supported to the tune of US$35,000 
annually, which is to cover both fees and living expenses. Students are legally 
obliged to return and work for the state at the conclusion to their studies, and their 
families incur a hefty penalty, for non-compliance with this provision. In practice, 
few fail to return, but not all remain in the public sector, with some transferring to 
private firms in Viet Nam.  
Other countries also provide development scholarships to enable Vietnamese 
students to study at HEIs abroad. A total of 298 such postgraduate scholarships were 
made available in 1996, rising to 315 in 1997, and 341 in 1998. Of these Australia 
provides around 80 per year, while Japan provides another 19 (25 in 1998). Total 
scholarships offered by various countries are shown in the Table 7. 
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Table 7. Study Abroad Scholarships, by Country, year 2000 
Country Number of Scholarships provided 
Canada 10 
United Kingdom 70 
France 200 
Australia 150 
Thailand 70 short + 10 long term 
Japan 60 
United States 30 (Masters) Fellowships. 
TOTAL 600 
Source:  Kelly, 2000: 11. 
In addition, perhaps twice this total are offered scholarships direct by overseas HEIs, 
foundations, or corporations, and thousands more were either on institutional 
scholarships, or financing themselves abroad. Statistics indicate that 1,400 students 
were enrolled in Australian universities in the year 2000, for example, while in the 
USA, after a post 1975 surge in enrolments, numbers fell appreciably, such that by 
1993, numbers had declined to less than 1,000, rising subsequently to 1,500 or so in 
1997 (Kelly 2000: 12).  
Of these, however, not all return (WTO 2006), and the UNDP sponsored Transfer of 
Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme, was developed in 
the 1990s to attract skilled and educated expatriates to return to Viet Nam to teach, 
train, and work, at least for a specific term, with the option of returning to their 
adopted country, upon completion. Resources are however, modest.  
Changing the Balance, Blurring the Borders 
Paralleling the process whereby public sector HEIs become more self governing, 
and more responsible for significant components of their budgets, some public HEIs 
are likely to be transformed into private, over the coming decade. As indicated, it is 
planned that by 2010, “…the number of non-public university and college students 
shall represent 30 per cent of the total” (Decision 47/2001 QD-TTg 4 April 2001). 
As well, Viet Nam’s accession to membership of WTO in January 2007, included, 
as part of its Service Sector commitment, provisions for joint ventures with overseas 
partners, (which can be majority foreign owned, and from 2009, the prospect of 
100% foreign ownership). While this commitment is commendably open, it will 
increase pressures on domestic regulatory agencies that will need to be able to sort 
the genuine initiatives from diploma mills and other less worthy ventures.  
In general, then, as with several other Southeast Asian states, issues arise from the 
increasing blurring of the borders between the public and private sectors. If the 
higher education sector is to be opened to foreign competition, and public sector 
HEIs are to be either formally transformed into private institutions, or so reformed 
that they conform more and more to the logic of business, as the World Bank 
recommends for Viet Nam, what will be the implications for access and equity? The 
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World Bank Development Report for 2001 argues that whereas “government has 
responsibility to ensure universal education,…private parties may play a role in the 
provision and financing of higher education” (World Bank, Viet Nam Development 
Report 2001: 62). 
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